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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALFRED L. RANGEL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920802-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 615, Utah Rules of Evidence, as amended effective 
April 29, 1991, provides (in redlined form): 
Rule 615. Exclusion of witnesses. 
{1} At the request of a party the court shall order 
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony 
of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its own 
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of: 
-fl-)-(a) a party who is a natural person-?—e*f§ 
42-Mb) an officer or employee of a party 
which is not a natural person designated as its 
representative by its attorney-?—eaffl 
43-K{c) a person whose presence is shown by a 
party to be essential to the presentation of his 
cause? or 
(d) an -adult victim in & criminal trial whers 
the prosecutor agrees with the victim's presence• 
{2} The court may exclude or excuse a victim from 
the courtroom if he becomes disruptive* 
{3} An. adult victim in a critftinal trial who elects 
to be present in the courtroom may not be prevented from 
"testifying, even after being pre&ent and having heard 
other testimony. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, section 1 provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property , without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-4 (1992) provides: 
78-7-4. Right to exclude in certain cases. 
In an action of divorce, criminal conversation, 
seduction, abortion, rape, or assault with intent to 
commit rape, the court may, in its discretion, exclude 
all persons who are not directly interested therein, 
except jurors, witnesses and officers of the court; and 
in any cause the court may, in its discretion, during the 
examination of a witness exclude any and all other 
witnesses in the cause. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. ALL ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL WERE 
PRESERVED BELOW. 
(Responding to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
The State argues that trial counsel's repeated objections 
to the presence of the victim at trial during the testimony of 
other witnesses were insufficient to preserve the issues of due 
process and unconstitutionality for appeal. See Brief of Appellee 
at Point I, pp. 14-21. The State ignores the purpose of the waiver 
doctrine, and overstates its breadth: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the record 
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of 
the objections and have an opportunity to correct any 
errors before the case goes to the jury. E.g. , State v. 
Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190, 192-3 (Utah 1976) . This requirement 
also assures that the appellate court will have a record 
of the grounds asserted below. If, however, the record 
on appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has 
been given a fair opportunity to avoid an error, we 
usually will not consider any claim based on that error. 
E.g. , Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) . 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988). 
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error 
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial 
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial 
court to correct any error, if error there be. 
Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (footnote 
omitted). 
A timely and recorded objection to the trial 
court's failure to comply with a request at trial puts 
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allows the 
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of 
the proceeding. . . . There is no support for 
appellant's claim that the trial judge knew the action he 
was requested to take but refused to take it. 
Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). 
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In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in 
issue at the trial may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A matter is 
sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial 
court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) . 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) . See also 
State v. Johnson, No. 900268, slip op. at 2 (Utah July 16, 1993) 
("A defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue 
before the issue can be raised in an appellate court.11) ; Lamkin v. 
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979) ("This point is raised for the 
first time on appeal and hence was not ruled upon by the trial 
court."); Wurst v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 
(Utah App. 1991) (issue sufficiently raised where mentioned in 
letter to department which served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision). 
In this case, all the purposes of the contemporaneous 
objection rule have been served. The trial court was apprised of 
the asserted error, given an opportunity to rule, and did in fact 
rule. The constitutionality of the amendments to Rule 615 was not 
raised for the first time on appeal, without an opportunity for the 
trial court to address the issue. 
Defense counsel stated, "I have a continuing objection to 
the victim being allowed to stay in the courtroom. I've got that 
matter up on appeal now, but I think on the record I need to make 
an objection." R. 69-70. This statement fully apprised the trial 
court of the contested matter. The grounds were not spelled out at 
length, but are obvious. Defense counsel cite due process and 
4 
unconstitutionality almost as frequently as the State is heard to 
assert waiver. 
The trial court knew what was requested of him, but 
declined to find the statute unconstitutional. He ruled. "I'll 
. deny the motion with respect to the victim. The victim may 
remain." Later, after a renewed objection specifically addressing 
allowing the victim to remain through opening arguments, the court 
again ruled: "The Rule provides for the victim -- the adult victim 
to be present; accordingly, she may remain." R. 82-3. The matter 
must now be conclusively resolved on appeal. 
Similarly, with respect to the prosecutor's improper 
question to the victim during opening arguments, defense counsel 
immediately objected. R. 83. No waiver has occurred. 
POINT 11. THIS COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED BY ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE, RULE, OR 
CASE LAW FROM DETERMINING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH STATUTES. 
(Responding to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
With no supporting authority whatsoever, the State baldly 
asserts that the Utah Court of Appeals is not empowered to declare 
Utah statutory provisions unconstitutional. Article VIII, section 
2 of the Utah Constitution only addresses the standard to be used 
by the Supreme Court for declaring a statute unconstitutional. No 
similar constitutional provision addresses what standards must be 
used by district courts or the Court of Appeals in declaring a 
statute unconstitutional. 
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Absent some requirement that the Court of Appeals sit en 
banc to address statutory constitutionality, its inability to do so 
is irrelevant. Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, 
this Court doesn't need to sit en banc. Three judge panels are 
fully adequate to address these questions. If the Court of Appeals 
finds a statute unconstitutional, upon subsequent review by the 
Supreme Court (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g) (Supp. 1993)) it 
can only find the statute unconstitutional upon a concurrence of a 
majority of its members, per Article VIII, section 2. 
As the State points out, "Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g) 
([Supp.] 199 [3]) vests the Utah Supreme Court with jurisdiction 
over a judgment of 'any court of record holding a statute . . . 
unconstitutional on its face . . . . ' " Brief of Appellee at p. 22. 
By necessary implication, some court of record must be able to 
declare a statute unconstitutional. By the State's reasoning, 
since the Court of Appeals is unable to declare statutes 
unconstitutional, such decisions must come from district courts or 
other lower courts. Upon such a determination, appeal to the Court 
of Appeals in criminal cases (as required for all but first degree 
and capital felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 
1993)) would be meaningless: the State contends that the Court of 
Appeals would be unable to affirm. An automatic reversal would 
result, and the matter would have to be taken up on certiorari for 
its first (if any)1 appellate determination on the merits. 
HJnlike an appeal from a Court of Appeals determination of 
facial unconstitutionality, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g) 
(Supp. 1993), appeal from a finding of constitutionality would be 
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Alternatively, if four Court of Appeals judges concur (see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1993)), the matter may be certified 
to the Supreme Court. This result was neither intended by the 
legislature, nor does it make any logical or jurisprudential sense. 
The State's basic premise is wrong. This Court CAN declare 
statutes unconstitutional. 
The State further argues, without citation to any 
authority whatsoever, that it would not be collaterally estopped 
from re-litigating the constitutionality of a statute declared 
unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals: "However, unless 
certiorari were granted under rule 46,[2] Utah Rule [s] of Appellate 
Procedure, and the panel ruling upheld, the question of the 
statute's constitutionality might be subject to re-litigation in 
subsequent cases: that is, there would be no 'collateral 
estoppel,' or issue preclusion." Brief of Appellee at 23. The 
State is wrong. Review will occur in all cases under § 78-2-
2(3) (g). If affirmed by the Supreme Court, the State would be 
collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue. 
Issue preclusion is applicable where (i) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue in 
the instant litigation; (ii) there was a final decision on the 
by certiorari only. Certiorari is, of course, discretionary with 
the Supreme Court. 
2The State inexplicably ignores the operation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g) (Supp. 1993). Where direct appeal as of right 
is provided, as in all cases where the Court of Appeals declares a 
statute facially unconstitutional, resort to certiorari is 
unnecessary. 
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merits; (iii) the party against whom collateral estoppel is pled 
was a party to or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; and (iv) was the issue competently, fully, and fairly 
litigated. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). 
All the criteria would apply to any attempt by the State to 
re-litigate the constitutionality of a statute.3 
Implicit in the State's position is the premise that 
decisions of the Court of Appeals have no precedential value or 
stare decisis effect. This preposterous assertion is belied by the 
State's citation to no less than nine Court of Appeals decisions in 
its brief. 
It is recognized under the doctrine of stare decisis 
that, once a point of law has been established by a 
court, that point of law will generally be followed by 
the same court and all courts of lower rank in subsequent 
cases where the same legal issue is raised. Stare 
decisis operates to promote system-wide stability and 
continuity by ensuring the survival of decisions that 
have been previously approved by a court. 
Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541, 554 (Kan. 1990) . 
Lest there be any doubt that the doctrine of stare decisis is 
applicable to decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Court is 
referred to State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) 
(discussing in dicta the stare decisis effect of a decision of the 
Court of Appeals on other panels of the Court of Appeals). 
The Court of Appeals has addressed the constitutionality 
of statutes in prior cases. In State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah 
theoretically, the State could argue their own incompetence, 
but this ploy should be rejected if the State is ever brazen enough 
to utilize it. 
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App. 1990), a panel of the Court of Appeals (per Jackson, J., 
Greenwood, J., concurring, and Bench, J., dissenting) declared that 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(3) (1986) and § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) 
were unconstitutional as violative of article VI, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution.4 This panel of the Court of Appeals has the 
same power to declare the 1991 amendments to Rule 615 to be 
unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should rule that the 1991 amendments to Rule 
615 are unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied to Mr. 
Range1. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
sequester the victim in this case. 
Mr. Rangel is entitled to an order of reversal with 
directions to enter a judgment of acquittal. At a minimum, Mr. 
Rangel is entitled to a new trial. 
4See also State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1992) 
(this Court declined to decide whether a loitering statute was 
constitutional, finding that good faith reliance on the validity of 
the statute was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion; 
nowhere does the opinion indicate the Court of Appeals does not 
have the authority to declare statutes unconstitutional. 
9 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2& 
K 
day of July, 1993 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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